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LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENCY: WHAT 
THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES GIVETH, IT  
CAN ALSO TAKE AWAY 
Abstract: Millions of foreigners strive to become Lawful Permanent Residents 
of the United States, but that status is limited to those immigrants who meet cer-
tain requirements and comply with extensive procedures. There is ample U.S. 
case law interpreting what it means to be “lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence.” Until the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 2017 in Kamal Turfah v. United 
States Citizenship & Immigration Services, however, no circuit court had found 
that a solely procedural error committed by U.S. immigration authorities could 
prevent an otherwise eligible immigrant from receiving lawful admission for 
Lawful Permanent Residency. This Comment assesses the unique situation that 
the plaintiff in Turfah presented when he was deemed unlawfully admitted, not 
because of his lack of entitlement to lawful permanent residency, but because 
U.S. immigration authorities failed to prevent him from entering the country be-
fore his father. Further, this Comment analyzes the consequences of the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision that places an undue burden on immigrants to ensure that im-
migration authorities are not negligent in their duties, as well as leaves immi-
grants who were otherwise entitled to lawful permanent residency with their sta-
tus in flux and with no clear pathway to naturalization. 
INTRODUCTION 
Citizenship through naturalization in the United States is a highly-
coveted status.1 Every year, approximately six million applications are re-
ceived from foreigners seeking to become Lawful Permanent Residents 
(“LPRs”) in the United States.2 In 2015, 1,051,031 people became LPRs 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (“USCIS”), Naturalization Fact Sheet (May 19, 
2017), https://www.uscis.gov/news/fact-sheets/naturalization-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/9H2Q-
RQ4Y] (recording that over half a million citizens are naturalized in the United States every year, 
with over seven million people naturalized in the last ten years); U.S Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
(“DHS”), Table 20. Petitions for Naturalization Filed, Persons Naturalized, and Petitions for Natu-
ralization Denied: Fiscal Years 1907 to 2015 (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-
statistics/yearbook/2015/table20 [https://perma.cc/E5CP-DVQH] (recording that levels of peti-
tions for U.S. naturalization have increased dramatically since the 1990s and continue to be high). 
 2 USCIS, Immigration and Citizenship Data (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/tools/
reports-studies/immigration-forms-data [https://perma.cc/YXS3-WW5V]. 
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who presumably will eventually pursue naturalization.3 In 2016, 752,800 
people became naturalized citizens.4 These numbers demonstrate that U.S. 
immigration policy affects millions of people, and any case law that further 
defines or restricts the path to naturalization in the United States has wide-
spread implications.5 
News coverage regarding immigrants and their endeavors to become 
residents in the United States is pervasive.6 Frequently, this coverage focus-
es on instances of immigrant fraud or misrepresentation.7 A rarely depicted 
situation, however, is one where an immigrant with a valid legal claim to 
LPR status is denied the chance to naturalize as a result of procedural errors 
committed by U.S. immigration authorities.8 In 1995, Kamal Turfah immi-
grated to the United States from Lebanon and received LPR status through a 
                                                                                                                           
 3 RYAN BAUGH & KATHERINE WITSMAN, DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. LAW-
FUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2015 1 (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
Lawful_Permanent_Residents_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KB6-9NZZ]. 
 4 USCIS, Naturalization, supra note 1. 
 5 See Tal Kopan, Trump Administration Adding Extra Hurdle for Green Cards, CNN (Aug. 
29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/28/politics/trump-administration-green-cards-interviews/
index.html [https://perma.cc/5A6Y-PCJ8] (noting that an interview may be enforced for green card 
applicants that will lengthen the process in an effort to protect against fraud impacting around 
180,000 people); David Nakamura, Trump Administration Announces End of Immigration Protection 
Program for ‘Dreamers,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2017/09/05/trump-administration-announces-end-of-immigration-protection-program-
for-dreamers/?utm_term=.094f9d67dd55 [https://perma.cc/Q93M-2GD7] (noting that hundreds of 
thousands of immigrants will be impacted and potentially forced to begin deportation proceedings 
when U.S. government rescinds the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) immigra-
tion program). 
 6 See Kopan, supra note 5 (reporting that green card applications may become a lengthier 
process due to the Trump Administration’s decision to enforce an interview requirement for appli-
cants in an effort to combat fraud); Nakamura, supra note 5 (reporting on the Trump Administra-
tion’s plan to end the DACA program that allowed hundreds of thousands of immigrants who 
arrived in the United States as children to remain in the country); Chris Stirewalt, Can GOP Find 
Consensus on Immigration?, FOX NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/
09/05/can-gop-find-consensus-on-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/9YLA-NHG4] (reporting on 
the divide in Congress about immigration issues and the uncertain future for DACA recipients). 
 7 See Gardiner Harris, State Department Tightens Rules for Visas to U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/us/politics/us-visa-rules-tillerson.html [https://
perma.cc/Y66A-AUAR] (discussing the Trump Administration’s changes to immigration policy in 
the hopes of preventing abuse of the legal immigration process); Newsweek Archives, For Many 
Immigrants, Marriage Is the Fastest and Easiest Way to Legal Rights, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 8, 2017), 
http://www.newsweek.com/immigration-legal-mating-game-647912 [https://perma.cc/BL4Q-SB75] 
(discussing the frequency of marriage fraud in order to obtain visas); Ron Nixon, Visa Program up 
for Renewal Amid Allegations of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/09/12/us/politics/visa-program-up-for-renewal-amid-allegations-of-fraud.html [https://perma.
cc/J5D7-KW9L] (discussing the fraud plaguing the EB-5 visa). 
 8 Turfah v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 845 F.3d 668, 670 (6th Cir. 2017) “Turfah 
II”. 
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derivative visa.9 Though Turfah had no trouble with his LPR status for al-
most twenty years, when he attempted to naturalize in 2012, he found out 
that because of the negligence of immigration authorities, he was not law-
fully admitted for permanent residency.10 He was subsequently barred from 
naturalizing.11 
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of LPR status in the United 
States and a key requirement in achieving naturalized citizenship—lawful 
admission for permanent residency.12 This requirement, although initially 
ambiguously defined, has undergone extensive interpretation by numerous 
circuit courts.13 Part I explains these decisions and details the expansion of 
“lawful admission” provided by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in Turfah v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Ser-
vices.14 Part II dives deeper into the Turfah decision and addresses how the 
majority reached its conclusion that the plaintiff was not lawfully admit-
ted.15 Additionally, it discusses the novelty of the court’s decision that pro-
cedural errors committed by U.S. immigration authorities are sufficient to 
render an otherwise eligible immigrant unlawfully admitted.16 Finally, Part 
III argues that the holding in Turfah has unforeseen consequences in that it 
places a burden on immigrants to police the negligence of immigration au-
thorities and fails to establish a practical way for immigrants to rectify defi-
ciencies with their LPR statuses.17 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Id. at 670, 673; see Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (2012) (stating that 
the child of a recipient of Lawful Permanent Residence (“LPR”) status who is not separately eligi-
ble for LPR status can receive immigrant status if they are “accompanying or following to join” 
their parent); see also USCIS, FILING FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE BASED ON A FAMILY PETI-
TION 4, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/About%20Us/Electronic%20Reading%20
Room/Customer%20Service%20Reference%20Guide/Permanent_Residents_Fam.pdf [https://perma.
cc/NQ8V-SZTH] (defining a derivative visa holder as an immigrant who does not have their own 
claim to reside in the United States, but who can “follow to join” or “accompany” a spouse or 
parent with a valid claim to U.S. residency). 
 10 Turfah v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 2:15-CV-10371, 2016 WL 362456, 
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2016), aff’d, 845 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2017) “Turfah I”.. 
 11 Turfah I, 2016 WL 362456, at *1, *4. 
 12 See infra notes 18–54 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 33–54 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 33–70 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 71–89 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 90–102 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 103–135 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE ELUSIVE AND EVOLVING DEFINITION OF “LAWFUL  
ADMISSION” IN THE UNITED STATES  
Section A of this Part provides an introduction to the history of immigra-
tion laws in the United States.18 It explains the requirements to become a 
LPR, including that an immigrant must be lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.19  Further, Section A details how federal courts have interpreted the 
phrase “lawful admission.”20 Section B discusses how Turfah’s case arrived 
in front of the Sixth Circuit and provides an overview of the court’s holding.21 
A. A Brief History of U.S. Federal Immigration Laws and the  
Judiciary’s Interpretation of “Lawful Admission” 
In 1875, in Henderson v. Mayor of New York, the Supreme Court de-
clared that the obligation of creating and managing U.S. immigration law 
fell to the federal government.22 This decision led to a series of legislative 
reforms regulating who could enter the country.23 These reforms sought to 
limit immigration through legislation prohibiting aliens with certain quali-
ties, changes in tax policies, and the establishment of new enforcement 
agencies.24 Beginning in 1940, the United States started to require foreign 
nationals to register and to document their right to reside in the country.25 A 
person with a documented claim to permanently remain in the United States 
is considered a LPR.26 LPRs have the opportunity to legally work in the 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 22–32 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 29–54 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 33–54 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 55–70 and accompanying text. 
 22 Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1875) (ruling that the federal government, 
and Congress specifically, is more qualified to regulate immigration in a consistent and appropri-
ate way than the states); USCIS, Early American Immigration Policies (Sept. 4, 2015), https://
www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/agency-history/early-american-immigration-
policies [https://perma.cc/MH28-EDWG]. 
 23 USCIS, Early American, supra note 22. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1301 (stating that an immigrant must be registered with the government in 
order to receive a visa); CitizenPath, History of the Green Card (Feb. 21, 2017), https://citizen
path.com/history-green-card/ [https://perma.cc/G6SC-GQ2H] (detailing the history of LPR status). 
In 1940, documenting an immigrant’s legal right to reside in the United States included getting 
fingerprinted and registering at the local post office. CitizenPath, supra. As immigration numbers 
increased, registration expanded to official immigration offices. Id. Those determined to have 
legitimate claims to reside in the United States were issued cards that detailed their status. Id. 
 26 BAUGH & WITSMAN, supra note 3; see also Juliana Jiménez Jaramillo, Why Isn’t My Green 
Card Green?, SLATE (July 4, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/design/2012/07/green_
card_history_u_s_immigrants_vital_document_through_the_years_.html [https://perma.cc/XUD5-
TSVB] (noting that the name “green card” comes from the green paper upon which immigrant’s 
documented claims to reside in the United States were historically printed). 
2018] Defining Lawful Permanent Residency Under the INA 333 
United States, receive financial aid, serve in the military, attend school, and 
own land.27 In addition, LPRs have the chance to naturalize and become 
U.S. citizens after living in the country for five years and fulfilling addi-
tional eligibility requirements.28 
Since 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) has been the 
law governing U.S. immigration and citizenship policy.29 Section 316 of the 
INA discusses the requirements to become a naturalized citizen.30 Pursuant 
to Section 316, an alien must have been “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence” in the United States to be eligible for naturalization.31 The INA 
defines “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” as the status an indi-
vidual has when he or she was legally permitted to immigrate to and per-
manently live in the United States.32 
This definition has been refined by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”).33 In 2003, in In re Koloamatangi, the BIA held that an alien has 
not been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” if he or she acquired 
                                                                                                                           
 27 BAUGH & WITSMAN, supra note 3. 
 28 See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (listing the requirements for naturalization, including residing in the 
United States for five consecutive years as a lawful permanent resident and having “good moral 
character”); USCIS, Naturalization, supra note 1 (describing additional eligibility requirements 
including “good moral character,” English literacy, a historical understanding of the United States, 
status as a legal adult, swearing an oath, and receipt of LPR status through lawful admission). 
 29 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (incorporating the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) as 
Title Eight of the U.S. Code); USCIS, Immigration and Nationality Act (Sept. 10, 2013), https://
www.uscis.gov/laws/immigration-and-nationality-act [https://perma.cc/GXG9-BK5P] (indicating 
that the INA has been amended since its inception in 1952, but still remains the governing statute 
over U.S. immigration and citizenship); see also Jerry Kammer, The Hart-Celler Immigration Act 
of 1965, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Sept. 30, 2015), https://cis.org/HartCeller-Immigration-Act-
1965 [https://perma.cc/E754-6STU] (indicating that the 1965 amendment of the INA, which 
adopted a major policy change that eradicated the previous immigration quota system, was in 
response to widespread criticism of the prior federal immigration legislation’s (the 1924 Johnson-
Reed Act) racial discrimination). 
 30 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (listing the requirements for naturalization, including residing in the 
United States for five consecutive years as a LPR and having good moral character). 
 31 Id. 
 32 See id. § 1101(a)(20) (defining “lawfully admitted for permanent residence”). 
 33 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2018). The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) was created within 
the Department of Justice to provide appellate review and rule clarifications, as well as to adminis-
ter U.S. immigration laws. Id. The BIA is comprised of twenty-one attorneys, one of whom is 
Chairman of the Board. Id. The BIA is authorized to hear immigration cases from across the coun-
try, and it conducts paper reviews, rather than trials in court, but the opportunity for oral argument 
can be requested. Id. The BIA’s judgments are binding law, unless overturned by a federal court’s 
ruling or by the Attorney General. Id.; see also Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. 548, 549–51 (B.I.A. 
2003) (interpreting “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” to mean that the visa must have 
been acquired without fraud, misrepresentation or mistake); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals, 
[https://perma.cc/V9NR-6WHD] (noting that the BIA conducts paper reviews of cases, has na-
tionwide jurisdiction, and its decisions are binding). 
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LPR status through “fraud or misrepresentation” or “had otherwise not been 
entitled to it.”34 The respondent in Koloamatangi obtained LPR status by 
marrying a U.S. citizen; however, the marriage was later determined to be 
knowingly fraudulent because the respondent was still legally married to a 
woman in Tonga.35 The BIA stated that an alien’s lawful admission not only 
requires following the procedural rules of immigration policies, but also 
conforming to the essential substance of the law.36 The BIA found that the 
respondent’s fraudulent marriage violated substantive immigration law and 
as a result, the respondent was never lawfully admitted.37 In its analysis, the 
BIA relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Longstaff, holding that, 
even when an immigrant is forthright, if the immigrant unintentionally vio-
lates substantive law regarding LPR eligibility, he is still not lawfully ad-
mitted.38 
Several circuit courts addressing the “lawful admission” issue adopted 
the holding in Koloamatangi and determined that aliens were not lawfully 
admitted if granted LPR status as a result of error or “had otherwise not 
been entitled to it.”39 Every circuit court addressing the “lawful admission” 
issue upheld the BIA’s reasoning in Koloamatangi that fraud, deception, and 
lack of entitlement are bars to “lawful admission.”40 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. at 549–50 (holding that a respondent who committed marriage 
fraud by marrying a U.S. citizen while already married had procured his LPR status through fraud 
and thus was never eligible for LPR status). According to Black’s Law Dictionary, fraud is de-
fined as “a knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce 
another to act to his or her detriment.” Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 35 Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. at 549. 
 36 Id. at 550 (noting that to obtain something lawfully means to comply with the legal obliga-
tions associated with it); see also In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1441 (5th Cir. 1983) (arguing 
that obtaining a visa through appropriate procedure alone is insufficient and that an alien must also 
comply with the substantive obligations of the law to achieve lawful admission into the United 
States). 
 37 Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. at 551. 
 38 Id. at 550; see Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1441 (concluding that the plaintiff, who was homo-
sexual, was unlawfully admitted to the United States when he responded “no” to an application 
question asking if he suffered from “psychopathic personality”). At the time, Congress included 
homosexuality in the definition of “psychopathic personality,” but the plaintiff was unaware of 
this definition. Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1441. Although the plaintiff followed correct procedure, and 
did not intend to lie in his application, the court found that his sexual orientation was a barrier to 
lawful admission because it rendered him excludable under immigration law at the time; therefore, 
he was not lawfully admitted. Id. 
 39 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 672; Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. at 550; see also Estrada-Ramos v. 
Holder, 611 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that an alien had not met lawful admission 
because he had once pled guilty to a cocaine offense which was a bar to visa eligibility); Savoury 
v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 449 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that an alien was not lawful-
ly admitted as a LPR because he failed to disclose a cocaine possession conviction). 
 40 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 672 (adopting the BIA’s interpretation of lawful admission from 
Koloamatangi); see also Injeti v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 737 F.3d 311, 315–16 
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For instance, in Injeti v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Ser-
vices, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that an immigrant who had submitted a 
fraudulent death certificate for her spouse and lied about prior marriages 
had intentionally misrepresented herself and deceived the U.S. govern-
ment.41 The court ruled that the plaintiff was not “lawfully admitted” as a 
permanent resident because she was only awarded LPR status as a result of 
this misrepresentation.42 Further, the Fourth Circuit stated that even if the 
plaintiff’s misrepresentation was not willful or intentionally fraudulent, an 
immigrant can fail to achieve “lawful admission” if that immigrant was 
simply not entitled to LPR status.43 
The Seventh Circuit observed that in addition to deception and falsifi-
cation, failure to disclose disqualifying information also provides a basis for 
violating “lawful admission.”44 In Estrada-Ramos v. Holder, the court rea-
soned that the plaintiff’s failure to disclose an expunged cocaine possession 
conviction, while not necessarily intentional misrepresentation, was still an 
offense that would have rendered him otherwise ineligible for LPR status.45 
In Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit ruled that an immi-
grant was not “lawfully admitted” after it was later determined that he had 
been convicted of drug trafficking and illegal reentry following his deporta-
tion.46 The prosecutor in Gonzales could not prove that the plaintiff had in-
                                                                                                                           
(4th Cir. 2013) (adopting Koloamatangi’s holding and finding an immigrant is not lawfully admit-
ted if the LPR status is received “by fraud—or who was not otherwise entitled to it”); WRONG 
Estrada-Ramos, 611 F.3d at 321 (adopting the BIA’s definition of “lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence”); Savoury 449 F.3d at 1317 (adopting the BIA’s definition of lawfully admitted 
and finding it “reasonable”); Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1183, 1187 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(adopting the BIA’s definition of lawfully admitted and finding it “reasonable”); Koloamatangi, 
23 I&N Dec. at 550. 
 41 Injeti, 737 F.3d at 314. 
 42 Id. at 314–15. 
 43 Id. at 317. The Fourth Circuit explained that although deliberate fraud will violate lawful 
admission, lawful admission can also be hindered regardless of an immigrant’s intention. Id. Here, 
because the plaintiff was not “otherwise entitled” to LPR status, she was not lawfully admitted, 
even if her fraud was accidental. Id. 
 44 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (rendering all aliens who have violated a U.S. con-
trolled substance law or conspired or attempted to violate a law inadmissible for any U.S. visa or 
entry into the country); Estrada-Ramos, 611 F.3d at 320–21 (noting that although Estrada-Ramos 
did not commit fraud to get his LPR status, he was not eligible for it, and only obtained it because 
of his undisclosed conviction). 
 45 Estrada-Ramos, 611 F.3d at 320–21. 
 46 Gonzales, 429 F.3d at 1184, 1186–87 (noting that the plaintiff served nine months in prison 
for the possession and sale of cocaine, an aggravated felony that bars him from LPR status under 
the INA, as did his illegal return to the United States after his deportation following his sentence). 
Although the government mistakenly granted the plaintiff LPR status, he was not entitled to it 
absent the mistake and thus was not lawfully admitted. Id. 
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tentionally deceived the government in obtaining his LPR status.47 But, in 
consensus with other circuit court holdings, the court held that willful fraud 
was not required to violate “lawful admission.”48 This decision expanded 
Koloamatangi by stating that admission was unlawful if an alien only re-
ceived LPR status due to a “negligent mistake” committed by immigration 
authorities.49 In Gonzales, regardless of the plaintiff’s intent, there were 
sufficient factors to prevent the plaintiff from being eligible for LPR status, 
and the government’s failure to note his prohibitive felony conviction did 
not change the fact that the plaintiff was never eligible for LPR and thus not 
lawfully admitted.50 
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held in Savoury v. United States Attorney 
General that an alien is not “lawfully admitted” when immigration services 
negligently grants LPR status.51 In this case, the plaintiff proactively in-
formed Immigration and Naturalization Services (“INS”) of his drug posses-
sion conviction and the conviction was recorded by INS.52 Despite this no-
tice, INS subsequently provided the plaintiff with LPR status.53 When the 
error was realized, INS rescinded the plaintiff’s LPR status on the grounds 
that he was never entitled to status adjustment because of his felony convic-
tion.54 
B. The Sixth Circuit Takes on “Lawful Admission” 
The Sixth Circuit did not rule on the definition of “lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence” until 2017 in its decision in Turfah.55 Turfah is a 
Lebanese citizen who has been living in the United States as a LPR since 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Id. at 1186. 
 48 Id. at 1187; see Injeti, 737 F.3d at 315 (stating that, even absent fraud, admission is unlaw-
ful if it fails to comply with immigration law or was received by mistake); Holder, 611 F.3d at 321 
(stating that fraud is not the only means of finding admission unlawful). 
 49 See Gonzales, 429 F.3d at 1186–87 (emphasizing that, despite being unable to prove that 
the plaintiff committed intentional fraud, the fact that the plaintiff’s LPR status was granted due to 
government negligence in failing to recognize the plaintiff’s prohibitive felony conviction does 
not render his LPR status lawful). 
 50 Gonzales, 429 F.3d at 1186–87. 
 51 Savoury, 449 F.3d at 1317. 
 52 Id. at 1310–11; see also USCIS, Did You Know?: The INS No Longer Exists (Apr. 13, 
2011), https://www.uscis.gov/archive/blog/2011/04/did-you-know-ins-no-longer-exists [https://
perma.cc/EEN8-253Z] (stating that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was a sepa-
rate agency that was a predecessor to USCIS, but closed in 2003, and its functions were adopted 
by USCIS). 
 53 Savoury, 449 F.3d at 1310. 
 54 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (rendering all aliens who have violated a U.S. con-
trolled substance law or conspired or attempted to violate a law inadmissible for any U.S. visa or 
entry into the country); Savoury, 449 F.3d at 1317. 
 55 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 672. 
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his entry into the country on September 23, 1995.56 Turfah arrived in the 
United States at nineteen years old on a derivative visa permitting him to 
enter the country “accompanying or following to join” his father, the princi-
pal LPR.57 But, Turfah arrived in the United States alone, twenty-four days 
before his father entered the country.58 U.S. immigration authorities errone-
ously admitted Turfah early, instead of informing him that he needed to wait 
to enter the country with, or after, his father.59 
After his admission, Turfah remained in the United States as a LPR for 
seventeen years and filed an application for naturalized citizenship with 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) on Novem-
ber 30, 2012.60 On April 29, 2014, USCIS denied Turfah’s naturalization 
application on the basis that he was not a lawfully admitted LPR because he 
arrived in the United States before his father in 1995, violating the terms of 
his derivative visa.61 On May 16, 2014, Turfah requested an administrative 
review of the denial of his application; his application was again denied by 
USCIS on December 29, 2014.62 
Turfah then filed suit against USCIS on January 28, 2015, in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking judicial review 
of the denial of his naturalization application.63 Both parties filed motions 
for summary judgment, and the district court granted USCIS’ motion, con-
cluding that Turfah was not lawfully admitted as a LPR, and, therefore, was 
ineligible for naturalization.64 Turfah appealed to the Sixth Circuit.65 This 
appeal forced the Sixth Circuit to address whether a procedural mistake 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id. at 670. 
 57 Id.; 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(1)–(a)(2) (2018) (defining an accompanying applicant to a princi-
ple visa holder as someone who cannot arrive before the principal applicant). The court in Turfah 
II spends a good deal of time analyzing the language of the derivative visa provision, concluding 
that “accompanying to join” means that Turfah needed to arrive in the United States with or after 
his father to comply with the requirements of the derivative visa. Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 673–74. 
 58 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 670. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Turfah I, 2016 WL 362456, at *1. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id.; Petition for De Novo Review of Denial of Application for Naturalization at 1, Turfah I, 
2016 WL 362456, at *1 (No. 15-10371) (alleging that Turfah is a valid LPR who was incorrectly 
denied the opportunity to naturalize). 
 64 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 670; Turfah I, 2016 WL 362456, at *1; Petitioner’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 6, Turfah I, 2016 U.S. WL 362456, at *1 (No. 15-10371) (arguing that 
Turfah was lawfully admitted and that the timing error should not affect his status); Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 9–10, Turfah I, 2016 WL 362456, at *1 (No. 15-10371) (argu-
ing that Turfah is not eligible for naturalization because he was not lawfully admitted by virtue of 
his failure to comply with the substantive requirements of a derivative visa). 
 65 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 670. 
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made by U.S. immigration authorities is sufficient to invalidate an appli-
cant’s otherwise lawful admission for permanent residence.66 
The Sixth Circuit concluded that although the violation in Turfah’s case 
was technical and the court was sympathetic to Turfah’s unique situation, Ko-
loamatangi’s holding that lawful admission mandates an alien comply with all 
substantive immigration requirements is reasonable.67 Moreover, the court 
concluded that although the error in Turfah’s LPR status was not based in any 
material issues with his application or his father’s, his early entry was still a 
violation of derivative visa law barring him from achieving “lawful admis-
sion.”68 The court interpreted Koloamatangi’s ruling consistently with most 
other circuit courts, concluding that an alien is not lawfully admitted if he or 
she commits fraud or lacks entitlement to LPR status.69 The court elaborated, 
however, that even absent fraud or misrepresentation, admission is also un-
lawful if LPR status is awarded to a meritorious applicant, but the govern-
ment’s error leads to a procedural violation of immigration law.70 
II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FINDS TURFAH UNLAWFULLY ADMITTED  
FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCY AND ESTABLISHES  
CONCERNING NEW PRECEDENT 
The Sixth Circuit found that Turfah was not lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence because he violated 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(2) by entering the 
United States before his father.71 Part A of this Section details the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s explanation of its decision to find Turfah unlawfully admitted for 
permanent residency.72 Part B of this Section highlights the novelty of the 
Turfah decision’s interpretation of lawful admission and its distinctions 
from other circuit courts’ interpretations.73 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id.; Notice of Appeal at 1, Turfah I, 2016 WL 362456, at *1 (No. 15-10371) (noting that 
Turfah appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of USCIS). 
 67 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 673, 675; Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. at 550. 
 68 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d. at 674–75 (expressing sympathy at the denial of Turfah’s naturali-
zation “based on a technicality”). 
 69 Id. at 672; see supra note 40 and accompanying text (adopting the BIA’s definition of 
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence” and finding it reasonable). 
 70 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 672. 
 71 Turfah v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 845 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir. 2017) 
“Turfah II”; see 20 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(2) (2017) (stating that an accompanying relative cannot pre-
cede the principal applicant). 
 72 See infra notes 74–89 and accompanying text. 
 73 See infra notes 90–102 and accompanying text. 
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A. An In-Depth Look at the Sixth Circuit’s Reasoning in Turfah 
The court’s reasoning commenced with an analysis of the INA defini-
tion of “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”74 The court stated that 
the INA’s definition was unclear and warranted further interpretation by the 
BIA and other circuit courts.75 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the BIA’s 
clarification of the definition of lawful admission in In re Koloamatangi, 
and its approval by every circuit court to confront the issue thereafter, was 
properly decided.76 In response, the Sixth Circuit determined it would also 
follow Koloamatangi’s holding that an immigrant is not lawfully admitted if 
their LPR status is erroneously granted as a result of the government’s mis-
take.77  
The court highlighted the ambiguity of the INA’s requirement under 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) that LPR status must be given “in accordance with the 
immigration laws,” and postulated that two different interpretations of this 
phrase exist.78 On the one hand, the court could construe this statute to 
mean that an immigrant is lawfully admitted so long as the immigrant is 
given entry by the government, even if the immigrant fails to meet all of the 
material requirements of LPR status.79 Alternatively, the court could decide 
that an immigrant is only lawfully admitted if he or she successfully com-
pletes all of the material LPR status requirements (essentially the BIA’s 
holding in Koloamtangi).80 The court reasoned that given the statute’s am-
biguity, it had to show deference to the BIA’s understanding of the statute, 
particularly because the executive branch holds a significant position in 
U.S. immigration policy.81 Further, the court noted that Turfah had not 
claimed or produced any evidence to support the conclusion that the BIA’s 
holding was unreasonable, and so it was forced to defer to Koloamatangi’s 
definition.82  
The court next addressed Turfah’s argument that USCIS’ interpretation 
of 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(2) defining “accompanying” led to “absurd results.”83 
The court stated that USCIS’ interpretation of “accompanying” was con-
sistent with the word’s recognized ordinary meaning, and that in contrast, 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 671. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 671–72. 
 77 Id. at 672. 
 78 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2012); Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 
672. 
 79 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 672–73. 
 80 Id. at 673. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
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Turfah’s broad reading of the term would go against Congress’ intention in 
writing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d).84 The court reasoned that Congress intended to 
ensure that immigrant children would arrive in the United States with or 
after their parents, and that since 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(2) follows this inter-
pretation, its plain meaning must be upheld.85  
The court concluded that because Turfah preceded his father he failed 
to comply with 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(2) and this violation means he was not 
lawfully admitted for permanent residency and was, therefore, ineligible to 
naturalize.86 The court conceded that Turfah’s case was “factually distinct” 
because Turfah did not commit fraud, misrepresentation, or criminal activi-
ty, but it determined that those variances were ultimately irrelevant because 
Turfah had statutorily violated 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).87  
Overall, the court’s opinion focused on the statutory language of 8 
U.S.C. § 1427(a) and 1153(d) and the meaning of “accompanying” when 
determining that Turfah was not lawfully admitted for permanent residen-
cy.88 The court’s decision paid little attention to the fact that Turfah only 
violated these statutes due to the error of U.S. immigration officers.89  
B. Turfah Renders Procedural Mistakes by Governmental Agents  
Sufficient to Bar Otherwise Lawful Admissions 
The court’s decision in Turfah v. United States Citizenship & Immigra-
tion Services marks the first time the Sixth Circuit adopted Koloamatangi’s 
definition of lawful admission.90 This ruling expands Koloamatangi in an 
unprecedented way by holding that an immigrant can be denied LPR status 
as a result of a procedural error made by the U.S. government, without any 
other fundamental bars in the immigrant’s application.91 Although other 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. at 673–74; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (noting that a child can obtain a derivative visa 
when accompanying or following to join a parent to the United States). 
 85 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 671–74. 
 89 See id. at 675 (noting that immigration officers “were presumably negligent in admitting 
Turfah” when he arrived early). 
 90 Id. at 672–73. 
 91 Id. at 674–75. The court states the facts in this case are far less extreme than those involved 
in decisions by other circuit courts; this case distinctly involves technical violations pertaining to 
procedure. Compare id. at 674 (stating that Turfah was unlawfully admitted because he entered 
the United States twenty-four days too early), with Injeti v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs., 737 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that Injeti was not lawfully admitted due to 
marriage fraud and submitting fraudulent documents when applying for LPR status), and Arella-
no-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that Gonzales was not lawful-
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circuit courts expanded Koloamatangi’s definition of unlawful admission to 
include cases without fraud, Turfah implicitly reasons that an alien can be 
unlawfully admitted even if the alien would have otherwise been eligible 
for LPR status absent the government’s mistake.92 Turfah and his father ap-
plied for LPR status through valid legal procedures without any fraud.93 
Moreover, Turfah’s father, the principal applicant, was considered lawfully 
admitted as a LPR and successfully became a naturalized citizen.94 Despite 
these facts, the Sixth Circuit maintained that Turfah statutorily violated the 
law governing derivative visas because he preceded his father twenty-four 
days early.95 
The rulings in Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales and Savoury v. United 
States Attorney General are similar to Turfah because they both conclude 
that their respective plaintiffs were unlawfully admitted as LPRs due to the 
negligence of immigration authorities.96 In Turfah, however, there was no 
underlying substantive issue, such as a criminal history or other barring of-
fense, to prevent Turfah from entitlement to LPR status prior to his proce-
dural error of entering the country before his father.97 Gonzales and Savoury 
                                                                                                                           
ly admitted because he was convicted of an aggravated felony involving controlled substances, 
was deported, and illegally reentered the country). 
 92 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674 (noting that Turfah’s LPR status issue was technical and 
non-fraudulent, acknowledging that Turfah’s father met the lawful admission requirement and 
successfully retained his LPR status); see also Injeti, 737 F.3d at 315–16 (noting that the plaintiff 
was never eligible for LPR status because of marriage fraud); Estrada-Ramos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 
318, 321 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff was never eligible for LPR status because of a 
felony drug conviction); Savoury v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 449 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(noting that the plaintiff was never eligible for LPR because of a felony drug possession convic-
tion); Gonzales, 429 F.3d at 1187 (noting that the plaintiff was never eligible for LPR status be-
cause of a felony drug possession conviction). 
 93 See Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 7 (describing Turfah’s 
and his father’s applications as legitimate and in compliance with visa application policy). Com-
pare Injeti, 737 F.3d at 312 (describing the plaintiff’s fraud through misrepresentation of a biga-
mous marriage and a fraudulent death certificate to acquire LPR), with Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674 
(describing a plaintiff whose application was honest and lacked any fraud or misrepresentation). 
 94 See generally Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64. 
 95 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674. 
 96 Id. at 675; see Savoury, 449 F.3d at 1317 (noting that the government erroneously granted 
the plaintiff LPR status despite being informed of his prior drug felony conviction); Gonzales, 429 
F.3d at 1186 (noting that the government mistakenly granted the plaintiff LPR status despite a 
drug felony conviction). 
 97 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674 (noting that Turfah was not lawfully admitted because he 
entered the country before his father); Savoury, 449 F.3d at 1310, 1317 (noting that the plaintiff 
was inadmissible and not eligible for LPR status due to his prior drug conviction, a substantive 
issue barring an applicant from receiving LPR status); Gonzales, 429 F.3d at 1187 (noting that the 
plaintiff was mistakenly approved for LPR status but would not have otherwise been entitled to 
that status because of his cocaine possession conviction, a substantive issue barring an applicant 
from receiving LPR status). 
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exhibit notable differences because their plaintiffs were both convicted of 
controlled substance felonies that went undiscovered by immigration au-
thorities during the granting of their LPR statuses.98 Had the U.S. govern-
ment known of these criminal histories beforehand, it would have immedi-
ately denied both plaintiffs’ applications for LPR status.99 
In contrast, there was no criminal activity to otherwise bar Turfah’s 
LPR application.100 Had Turfah waited twenty-four days and arrived with 
his father, or had U.S. immigration authorities properly informed a teenage 
Turfah at the border that he was not allowed to enter without his father, 
there would be no reason to deny Turfah’s LPR application.101 In addition, 
Turfah’s father’s successful naturalization indicates there was no fundamen-
tal issue with their visas except for this procedural snafu at the hands of the 
government.102 
III. SIXTH CIRCUIT OVERLOOKS THE IMPLICATIONS TURFAH WILL HAVE ON 
AN IMMIGRANT’S BURDEN AND ABILITY TO NATURALIZE 
Turfah v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services establishes 
that an immigrant who validly applies for and has been approved for LPR 
status may lose the status as a result of procedural violations committed by 
government agents.103 In doing so, it establishes a precedent that could cre-
ate unfair and unpreventable consequences for immigrants seeking LPR 
statuses.104 
While it is reasonable to require compliance with immigration laws, 
Turfah was wrongly decided on two counts.105 First, Part A of this Section 
discusses how the ruling in Turfah creates a new burden for immigrants to 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Gonzales, 429 F.3d at 1184 (noting that Gonzales had a criminal history where he was 
convicted for possession to sell cocaine). Technically, in Savoury, the INS was in fact informed of 
this criminal history, but it was not properly considered and noted when the LPR status was grant-
ed. Savoury v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 449 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2006). If it had been realized, 
the LPR status would have been denied out of hand because a felony conviction is a bar to LPR 
status. Id. 
 99 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (rendering all aliens who have violated a U.S. con-
trolled substance law or conspired or attempted to violate a law inadmissible for any U.S. visa or 
for entry into the country). 
 100 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674. 
 101 Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 7–8. 
 102 See id. (stating that “the principal alien secured a valid immigrant visa through the appro-
priate diplomatic channels” and Turfah’s father became a naturalized citizen). 
 103 Turfah v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 845 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2017) 
“Turfah II”. 
 104 See id. at 676–77 (Boggs, J., concurring) (noting that USCIS has not made it clear what 
Turfah’s status is now, or how he can adjust his status). 
 105 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674–75. 
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monitor immigration procedure.106 Second, Part B of this Section discusses 
how the ruling leaves LPRs in Turfah’s situation without a clear method to 
remedy the deficiencies in their LPR status so that they may eventually nat-
uralize.107 
A. Turfah Unfairly Burdens Immigrants with Ensuring That United States 
Immigration Authorities Comply with the Law 
Because of the court’s decision in Turfah, an LPR-eligible immigrant 
may be denied lawful admission through pure procedural error and no fault 
of the alien.108 This reasoning places a burden on applicants to ensure that 
the U.S. government does not commit any errors when admitting them into 
the country.109 This burden falls on immigrant applicants already shoulder-
ing the substantial burden of providing all required information in good 
faith to immigration services.110 After Turfah, the onus is now on the alien 
to ensure that governmental agents are not making mistakes that will impact 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Id. at 675; see infra notes 108–122 and accompanying text. 
 107 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 675 (observing that Turfah’s case is sympathetic but placing the 
onus on USCIS to utilize discretion and come up with a solution to allow Turfah to eventually 
naturalize); id. at 676–77 (Boggs, J., concurring) (observing there is not an established procedure 
for someone who already has LPR status to reapply for lawful admission); see also infra notes 
123–135 and accompanying text. 
 108 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674–75. 
 109 See Injeti v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 737 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2013). 
The court in Injeti briefly addressed this issue when ruling that an alien who had misrepresented 
herself was not lawfully admitted as a LPR. Id. The court stated that it is not the job of an alien to 
provide affirmative evidence that would refute any and all admission issues; however, an alien 
does have to provide proof when there is “reason to suspect” unlawful admission. Id. This obser-
vation implies that an alien does still have to show proof whenever a reason of doubt arises. Id. 
This case is distinct from Turfah, however, because in Injeti there was clear misrepresentation, and 
the applicant was not eligible for LPR status without that mistake. Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674; see 
generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, CROSSING THE LINE: U.S. BORDER AGENTS ILLEGALLY REJECT 
ASYLUM SEEKERS (2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-crossing-the-line-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2CA-DSJE] (documenting instances where U.S. immigration au-
thorities illegally deny immigrants interviews or entry and only follow procedures when prompted 
by professional immigration advocates, illustrating an unfair burden on immigrants to know their 
rights and U.S. immigration policies). 
 110 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012); Petitioner’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 8–9. Section 1361 establishes an alien’s burden of proof 
when applying for a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1361. It is the alien’s responsibility to show that he or she is 
eligible for the visa and that he or she has the proper documents. Id. This statute is silent, however, 
on what to do when an alien has already been determined eligible for a visa but is then found to be 
unlawfully admitted because the government failed to inform the alien he is too early. Id. Turfah 
and his father arguably already carried out their burden when they were validly approved for an 
LPR visa; the only unlawful component arose when Turfah was mistakenly admitted early by 
immigration authorities. Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674. The court acknowledged that the only basis 
for Turfah’s denial was governmental oversight. Id. at 674–75. 
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their lawful admission.111 This additional burden should not fall on foreign 
immigrants, and particularly not on minor immigrants arriving on derivative 
visas.112 It is not reasonable to expect these applicants to know and under-
stand U.S. immigration law well enough to ensure governmental agents fol-
low appropriate procedure and to correct them when they do not.113 
The court reasons that permitting derivative applicant minors who ar-
rive before their respective principal applicants would create pandemonium 
for U.S. immigration officials.114 The court postulates a future “slippery 
slope,” wherein very young children are sent to the United States without 
guardians, for potentially much greater time intervals.115 It is reasonable to 
uphold the principles of a derivative visa requiring a child to enter the Unit-
ed States with or after a parent’s arrival.116 Nevertheless, whether derivative 
applicants should be able to legally arrive without their guardians is not the 
issue.117 Rather, the problem this decision creates is that a U.S. government 
official should bear the responsibility of informing an otherwise qualified 
derivative LPR applicant that he or she must wait until their guardian is 
with them to enter.118 
It seems unlikely that the intent of the INA is to deny a minor child, 
like Turfah, lawful admission as a result of governmental failings when he 
would have otherwise rightfully earned his LPR status alongside his fa-
ther.119 The Supreme Court has determined that Congress’ intent in creating 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 7–8. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 8–9. 
 114 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674–75 (observing that the “accompanying” component of a 
derivative visa is reasonable and its absence could create a chaotic situation where minors are 
allowed to immigrate long before their guardians; Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
supra note 64, at 9 (observing that a derivative visa holder cannot arrive before the principal ap-
plicant). 
 115 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674 (imagining the results of immigrant children arriving days 
or months before their parents). 
 116 See id. at 674–75 (noting that the accompanying requirement for a derivative visa is not 
“absurd”). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 8; see Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 
677 (Boggs, J., concurring) (noting that the government admitted its own responsibility and fault 
for the procedural mistake of allowing Turfah in prematurely when they should have turned him 
away). 
 119 Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 8; see Cynthia S. Ander-
fuhren-Wayne, Family Unity in Immigration and Refugee Matters: United States and European 
Approaches, 8 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 347, 352–53 (1956) (stating that the “legislative concern” of 
Congress when creating the INA was to emphasize family unity); see also Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d 
543, 547 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that the underlying principle of visas in U.S. immigration law is 
family unity). 
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the INA was a concern for family preservation and unity.120 The goal of de-
rivative visas is to unite family members, not to penalize those who suffer 
procedural negligence but were otherwise entitled to legal entry.121 There is 
room to distinguish cases where an immigrant’s criminal history is negli-
gently overlooked by immigration authorities from someone who meets all 
of the qualifications for LPR status but is forced into noncompliance with 
the law because of governmental agency incompetency.122 
B. Turfah Leaves Immigrants in Limbo with No Vehicle for Naturalization 
The court’s decision in Turfah raises the question of what this means 
for Turfah’s current LPR status and any future attempts he makes to natural-
ize.123 Although Turfah’s LPR status can no longer be rescinded by USCIS 
because he has had it for longer than five years, the court found him unlaw-
fully admitted and, therefore, ineligible to meet the requirements of natural-
ization.124 The Sixth Circuit operated under the assumption that Turfah cur-
rently has LPR status, even though he was not lawfully admitted.125 How-
ever, Judge Boggs notes in his concurrence that the government provided 
“inconsistent statements” about whether or not Turfah is still a LPR.126 
USCIS had previously stated that Turfah was a “nonimmigrant,” but then on 
other occasions stated that he still had LPR status.127 Assuming as the ma-
jority did that Turfah is still a LPR, this case’s holding does not establish a 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Anderfuhren-Wayne, supra note 119, at 353; Monique Lee Hawthorne, Family Unity in 
Immigration Law: Broadening the Scope of “Family”, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 809, 814–15 
(2007). 
 121 Lau, 563 F.2d at 547; Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 7–8; 
Anderfuhren-Wayne, supra note 119119. 
 122 Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 6–7; see also Turfah II, 845 
F.3d at 674 (conceding that the cases USCIS provided for their supporting arguments were all 
“factually more extreme” than Turfah’s situation and involved undisclosed or misrepresented 
criminality). Compare Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 670, 675 (stating that Turfah was not lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residency because he entered before his father), with Injeti, 737 F.3d at 316 
(stating that Injeti was not lawfully admitted due to committing marriage fraud and submitting 
fraudulent documents when applying for LPR status), and Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 
1183, 1184 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that Gonzales was not lawfully admitted because he was con-
victed of an aggravated felony involving controlled substances, was deported, and illegally reen-
tered the country). 
 123 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 676 (Boggs, J., concurring). 
 124 Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1256 (noting that USCIS can rescind LPR status during the first 
five years after the status is adjusted). In Turfah II, the five-year time period in which USCIS can 
rescind LPR status had passed, so regardless of the court’s ruling that Turfah was not lawfully 
admitted, the government cannot rescind his LPR status or remove him. Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 676 
(Boggs, J., concurring). 
 125 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 676 (Boggs, J., concurring). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
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procedure for how a LPR can change his status from unlawful to “lawful 
admission.”128 Moreover, there is no known process in existence for an im-
migrant that is already considered a LPR to petition to adjust that status to 
be “lawfully admitted.”129 The court expressed a hope that USCIS would 
exercise discretion in assisting Turfah to reapply for LPR, but this outcome 
is unlikely considering USCIS is responsible for the continued denial of 
Turfah’s naturalization application in the first place.130 Judge Boggs sug-
gests that Turfah could become lawfully admitted if he can convince USCIS 
to permit him to file an adjustment of status form (Form I-485) and USCIS 
grants that change.131 It seems apparent that Turfah would need to reapply 
for LPR altogether to render his admission lawful, but it is unclear whether 
USCIS will allow Turfah to reapply and, if so, whether he could lose the 
status he has now in the reapplication process.132 Given that Turfah’s statu-
tory violation is the result of the U.S. government’s mistake, it seems that 
the responsibility should fall on the government to suggest a solution to 
remedy their error.133 Moreover, given that Turfah has opened up the door to 
future governmental negligence rendering immigrants unlawfully admitted, 
it is prudent that the government come up with a documented procedure for 
how to handle these cases so that immigrants are not left in limbo with no 
recourse or clear status in the future.134 Turfah has been in the United States 
for over two decades, and his immigration status should not be left in flux 
because of the government’s oversight.135 
CONCLUSION 
Permanent residency and naturalization in the United States are highly 
regulated and sought-after statuses with numerous eligibility requirements. 
“Lawful admission” as a LPR is necessary to naturalize, but its definition 
was ambiguous and required further interpretation by the BIA and several 
circuit courts. Every circuit court that has deciphered the issue has upheld 
the BIA’s ruling in Koloamatangi, holding admission unlawful if it involved 
fraud, misrepresentation, or if the alien was not eligible for LPR status ab-
sent a mistake. In Turfah, the Sixth Circuit expanded on Koloamatangi by 
                                                                                                                           
 128 Id. at 676–77. 
 129 Id. at 677. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 See id. (noting that the government acknowledged its error in admitting Turfah early and 
not turning him away when they should have). 
 134 Id.  
 135 Id. at 670, 677. 
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determining that admission may be unlawful as a result of procedural negli-
gence committed by the U.S. government, even if an alien was otherwise 
properly entitled to LPR status. This holding affects not only the definition 
of “lawful admission” but also has potential implications on the burden an 
immigrant bears when entering the country, as well as what becomes of an 
immigrant’s LPR status if he pursues reapplying for LPR status to right the 
government’s error. 
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